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1917:
Was Judge Learned Hand's Understanding of
the Act Defensible?
THE ORIGINS OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT OF

Geoffrey R. Stone*
In the spring offensives of 1915, England and France lost 240,000 men
and Germany 140,000, with no net change in position.' The following
summer, the British suffered 60,000 casualties on a single day in the Battle
of the Somme.2 Between the outbreak of war in Europe and the decision of
the United States to enter the conflict in the spring of 1917, there was
continuing debate about the nation's best course of action. Most Americans
believed that the war in Europe did not implicate vital interests of the United
States. What finally drew the United States into the war was the German
submarine blockade.3
Unlike the British, who could deny Germany essential supplies by laying
minefields in its narrow shipping routes, the Germans had to resort to
submarine warfare to cut off shipping to England and France, which had
broad access to the sea.4 These blockades infuriated the neutrals, who
maintained that they were entitled under international law to trade freely with
all belligerents. Although Americans valued the "freedom of the seas," most
did not find it a sufficiently compelling reason to spill American blood on the
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battlefields of Europe.' The more sensible course was to stand aside, forego
trade with the belligerents, and let the storm pass.
Nonetheless, in the winter of 1917, after German submarines sank three
American vessels,6 President Woodrow Wilson-who had won reelection the
preceding fall on the slogan that he had "kept America out of war"-sought
a declaration of war.7 He proclaimed that the United States could not "choose
the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our
people to be ignored or violated."'
The voices of dissent were immediate. On April 4, during Congress's
debate over the war resolution, Republican Senator George Norris of
Nebraska stated that "we are about to put the dollar sign upon the American
flag." 9 Like Norris, many Americans saw the conflict not as a war to make
the world "safe for democracy" but as a war to make the world safe for
munitions manufacturers and armaments traders.o Wilson's proposal to
reinstitute the draft also triggered bitter attacks.
Wilson was a man with little tolerance for criticism. In seeking a
declaration of war, he cautioned that "ifthere should be disloyalty, it will be
dealt with with a firm hand of stern repression."" Disloyal individuals, he
explained, "had sacrificed their right to civil liberties." 2 In these and similar
pronouncements, he set the tone for what was to follow. Wilson understood
that, if dissent was allowed to fester, it could undermine the nation's morale
and make it more difficult to prosecute the war. Wilson knew that war is not
merely a battle of armies but a contest of wills, and that defeat could come
from collapse of the home front as readily as from failure in the trenches.
Opposition to our entry into the war in Europe came from many quarters,
Americans of German ancestry made up almost twenty-five percent of the
population in 1917.1' They did not relish the prospect of war between the

5.
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ALTON LEE, FROM SNAKE OIL TO MEDICINE: PIONEERING PUBLIC HEALTH 129 (2007) (explaining

that Americans in Kansas did not find freedom of the seas to be an overpowering reason to
participate in the war).
6.
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10. Wilson, supranote 8, at 525.
11. Id at 526.
12. Paul L. Murphy, WORLD WAR I AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED
STATES 53 (1979) (discussing Woodrow Wilson's Third Annual Address to Congress).
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United States and Germany.' 4 Internationalists and pacifists also opposed our
entry into the war." Jane Addams and Crystal Eastman, for example,
despised war as an archaic and immoral means of resolving international
disputes. 6 The Socialists also protested America's declaration of war. With
a sharper edge than the pacifists, the Socialists argued that war was a
capitalist tool contrived by industrialists to boost armament sales and enforce
social order, while bringing only misery, demoralization, and death to the
working class." Anarchists also opposed American participation in World
War I. Mostly recent European immigrants, the anarchists were more
radical-and more militant-than the Socialists."
Alexander Berkman, an anarchist leader, told a mass rally in New York
City, "When the time comes we will not stop short of bloodshed to gain our
ends," and Emma Goldman, known in the press as the High Priestess of
Anarchism,19 wrote that "at this critical moment it becomes imperative for
every liberty-loving person to voice a fiery protest against the participation
of this country in the European mass-murder." 20
Less than three weeks after Congress voted a declaration of war, it began
debate on what would become the Espionage Act of 1917.21 Although
directed primarily at such matters as espionage and the protection of military
secrets, the bill included three sections directly relevant to free speech in
wartime.
For the sake of convenience, I shall refer to them as the "press censorship"
provision, the "disaffection" provision, and the "nonmailability" provision.
An understanding of the debate over these three provisions is essential to
14. See id. at 270-72.
15. See ELIZABETH MCKILLEN, MAKING THE WORLD SAFE FOR WORKERS 54-55 (2013);
Wendy E. Chmielewski, Opposition to the War in the United States, HOME BEFORE THE LEAVES
FALL, https://wwionline.org/articles/opposition-war-united-states/ (last updated July 15, 2014).
16. See JANE ADDAMS, PEACE AND BREAD IN TIME OF WAR 61-62 (1922); LINDA K.
SCHOTT, RECONSTRUCTING WOMEN'S THOUGHTS 102 (1997).
17. See MCKILLEN, supra note 15, at 56, 91.
18. Compare DOENECKE, supra note 3, at 256, 276 (discussing how socialists proposed and
engaged in strikes), with Emma Goldman, The Promoters of the War Mania, MOTHER EARTH,
Mar. 1917, at 5, 5 ("At this critical moment it becomes imperative for every liberty-loving person
to voice a fiery protest against the participation of this country in the European mass-murder."),
and Alexander Berkman, Anarchist Rally in Union Square (July 14, 1914), quoted in RICHARD
POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS 22 (1987) ("When the time comes we will not stop short of
bloodshed to gain our ends.").
19. The Police May Turn Hose on Anarchists, PUBLIC LEDGER, Sept. 28, 1909, at 2,
microformed on The Emma Goldman Papers: A Microfilm Edition, at Reel 47 (Candace Falk et

al. eds., 1990).
20.
21.
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understanding what went wrong in the United States over the next eighteen
months.
As presented to Congress, the "press censorship" provision would have
made it unlawful for any person in time of war to publish any information
that the President declared to be "of such character that it is or might be useful
to the enemy. "22 The "disaffection" provision would have made it unlawful
for any person willfully to "cause or attempt to cause disaffection in the
military or naval forces of the United States." 23 The "nonmailability"
provision would have granted the Postmaster General authority to exclude
from the mails any writing or publication that violated "any of the provisions
of this act" or was otherwise "of a treasonable or anarchistic character." 24
The press censorshipprovision provoked the most heated discussion. The
Wilson administration's support of this section triggered a firestorm of
protest from the press, which objected that it would give the President the
final authority to decide whether the press could publish information about
the conduct of the war.2 5 Opposition to the provision was fierce. Senator
Hiram Johnson of California reminded his colleagues that "the preservation
of free speech" is of "transcendent importance, "26 and Representative
William Wood of Indiana warned that it could become "an instrument of
tyranny." 27 Describing the provision as "un-American," Representative
Martin B. Madden of Illinois protested that "[w]hile we are fighting to
establish the democracy of the world, we ought not to do the thing that will
establish autocracy in America. "28
When it began to appear that the press censorship provision would go
down to defeat, President Wilson made a direct appeal to Congress, stating
that the "authority to exercise censorship over the press . . . is absolutely

necessary to the public safety." 29 Members of Congress were unmoved. On
May 31, 1917, the House defeated the provision by a vote of 184-144,

22. 55 CONG. REc. 1661, 1695 (1917).
23. H.R. REP. No. 64-1591, at 1 (1917); see 55 CONG. REc. 769, 793 (1917) (discussing the
use of the word "disaffection").
24. H.R. 291, 65th Cong. § 1100 (1st Sess. 1917), reprintedin 55 CONG. REc. 1563, 1595
(1917).
25. See Resolutions of the Am. Newspaper Publishers' Ass'n (Apr. 25, 1917), reprintedin
55 CONG. REc. 1844, 1861 (1917); see generally H.R. REP. No. 65-30, at 2, 10 (1917).
26. 55 CONG. REc. 2081, 2097 (1917).
27. 55 CONG. REc. 1725, 1773 (1917).
28. Id
29. Wilson Demands Press Censorship,N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1917, at 1 (quoting a letter
from President Woodrow Wilson to Representative Edwin Yates Webb).
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effectively ending consideration of the "press censorship" provision for the
duration of the war.3 0
The nonmailability provision also generated controversy. Several
members of Congress objected to granting the Postmaster General such broad
authority to exclude political material from the mail.3 ' Senator Charles
Thomas of Colorado, for example, argued that this provision would produce
"a far greater evil than the evil which is sought to be prevented[,,]" 3 2 and
Representative Meyer London of New York declared the provision a
"menace to freedom," adding that "there is nothing more oppressive . . than
a democracy gone mad." 33
After vigorous debate, Congress amended the "nonmailability" provision
to replace the phrase "treasonable or anarchistic character" with the much
narrower phrase "containing any matter advocating or urging treason,
insurrection or forcible resistance to any law of the United States."34 It is
noteworthy that as a result of this amendment only express advocacy of
unlawful conduct could fall within the catchall clause of the provision.
Statements that did not expressly advocate "treason, insurrection or forcible
resistance" could not be excluded from the mail. As we know, this is a critical
distinction in later debates about the meaning of both the Espionage Act and
the First Amendment.
The disaffectionprovision, which turned out to be the most important part
of the bill, received less attention. But even this provision was amended in a
significant manner. The potential difficulties with this provision were made
clear in hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary. Gilbert Roe,
a civil liberties lawyer who represented the Free Speech League, explained
that under the "disaffection" provision every effort to discuss or criticize the
war could be "brought under the ban."3 5 In light of these concerns, the
Judiciary Committee found the term "disaffection" to be "too broad," "too
elastic," and "too indefinite." 36 In order to narrow and clarify the provision,

30.
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1918, at 161 (2012).
31. 55 CONG. REC. 2045, 2056-71 (1917).
32. Id. at 2062.
33. 55 CONG. REC. 1725, 1779 (1917).
34. H.R. REP. No. 69, at 16 (1917) (Conf Rep.); see also 55 CONG. REC. 3093, 3124-29
(1917) (reading H.R. REP. No. 69 into the record); 55 CONG. REC. 3273, 3301-07 (1917) (reading
H.R. REP. No. 69 into the record).
35. Espionage and Interference with Neutrality: Hearingon H.R. 291 Before the H Comm.
on the Judiciary, 65th Cong. 39 (1917).
36. 55 CONG. REC. 1563, 1594 (1917) (statement of Rep. Webb).
BILL OF RIGHTS TO THE SEDITION ACT OF
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it replaced the phrase "cause or attempt to cause disaffection" with "cause or
attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty."37
After nine weeks of grueling debate, Congress enacted the Espionage Act
of 1917, as amended.3 8 Violations were punishable by prison terms of up to
twenty years. As the congressional debate suggests, the legislation, as
enacted, was not a broadside attack on all criticism of the war. It was, rather,
a carefully considered enactment designed to deal with specific military
concerns. But what would the Act mean in practice? Would passing out
antiwar leaflets be regarded as a willful "attempt to cause insubordination"?
Would a public speech denouncing the draft be deemed a deliberate
obstruction of "the recruiting or enlistment service"?
Much would depend on the attitude and approach of the Wilson Justice
Department. The administration was clearly disappointed with the
legislation. Not only had Wilson's personal appeal to Congress been
rebuffed, but a year later Attorney General Thomas Gregory publicly
expressed the administration's frustration with the Act. Gregory complained
that when war broke out the administration had "secured the passage of the
Espionage Act, but most of the teeth which we tried to put in it were taken
out."3 9 In light of the President's caustic statements about disloyalty, and the
Attorney General's evident disappointment in the legislation, there was little
reason to expect much prosecutorial restraint. Any doubt on this score was
erased when Attorney General Gregory, referring to war dissenters, declared
in November 1917, "May God have mercy on them, for they need expect
none from an outraged people and an avenging government. "40
Because there had been no direct attack on the United States, and no direct
threat to America's national security, the Wilson administration needed to
create an "outraged people." To build a sense of patriotic fervor, Wilson
established the Committee on Public Information (CPI), under the direction
of George Creel, a journalist and public relations expert. 4 1 The CPI produced
a flood of pamphlets, news releases, speeches, newspaper editorials, political
cartoons, and even motion pictures. Its efforts concentrated on two main

37. See Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (1917).
38. Id
39. Thomas Gregory, Suggestions ofAttorney GeneralGregory to Executive Committee in
Relation to the Department ofJustice, 4 A.B.A. J. 305, 306 (1918).
40. ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA: FROM 1870
TO THE PRESENT 108 (G.K. Hall & Co. 1978).
41. Christopher B. Daly, How Woodrow Wilson's PropagandaMachine ChangedAmerican
Journalism, CONVERSATION (Apr. 27, 2017, 9:51 PM), https://theconversation.com/howwoodrow-wilsons-propaganda-machine-changed-american-journalism-76270.
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themes: feeding hatred of the enemy and promoting a suspicion of anyone
who might be "disloyal."
As the CPI whipped the nation into a frenzy of patriotism, many
communities went so far as to ban German-language teaching and burn
German-language books.4 2 In the first month of the war, Attorney General
Gregory asked loyal Americans to act as voluntary detectives and to report
their suspicions directly to the Department of Justice. The results were
staggering. Each day, thousands of accusations of disloyalty flooded into the
department.43 Adding to the furor, the CPI encouraged citizens to form
voluntary associations dedicated to informing the authorities of possible
disloyalty.
The activities of these organizations went well beyond reporting alleged
disloyalty. With implicit immunity, they engaged in wiretaps, bugged offices,
and examined bank accounts and medical records.44 Vigilantes ransacked the
homes of German Americans.4 5 In Oklahoma, a former minister who opposed
the sale of Liberty bonds was tarred and feathered.46 In Illinois, an angry mob
wrapped an individual suspected of disloyalty in an American flag and then
murdered him on a public street.4 7
Wilson, Gregory, and Creel helped create not only an "outraged public"
but a fearful and intolerant nation.
It was in this atmosphere of accusation and suspicion that federal judges
were called upon to interpret and apply the Espionage Act of 1917. And it
was in this atmosphere that Judge Learned Hand entered the fray.
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